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7 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT : Proposal to Send United States Government Foodstuffs
to East Germany

REFERENCE : EE Division Memorandum to DCI, same subject, 30 June 1953

1. Pursuant to the 1 July 1953 decision of the Psychological Strategy Board that U. S. Government agencies should give further study to the possibilities of offering U. S. food to the East German population, the subject has been fully explored by an inter-agency committee under the PSB, and the views of HICOG have been obtained. It appears that there now is substantial agreement among affected agencies on both the basic idea and the proposed manner of implementation. This memorandum summarizes the final proposal as developed by the Department of State and traces the course of recent deliberations, indicating the factors which are pertinent in considering the proposal.

25X1 2. A PSB inter-agency working committee, comprising representatives of State, Defense, and NSA, which met on 3 July 1953, agreed that the proposal to furnish food to East Germany should be supported despite certain technical legislative objections raised by the State Department Office of Economic Affairs. The committee recommended that the U. S. offer be addressed to the Soviet Union, either directly to Moscow or to the Soviet High Commissioner in Germany. It was felt that the note should be flexible and should not contain detailed conditions which might enable the Soviets to reject the offer on extraneous grounds. The committee believed that approximately \$15,000,000 worth of foodstuffs would be appropriate for distribution in the Soviet zone of Germany to alleviate current suffering without having an appreciable long-term affect on the economy, living conditions, and internal tensions of the Soviet zone. It was agreed that Congressional approval for the plan would be desirable if it could be obtained expeditiously. Although Congressional approval might be required to authorize the transfer of food from U. S. agriculture surpluses, the Department of Defense representative offered to make available 75,000,000 Army "C" ration units for transfer to the Soviet zone under the plan. Such a transfer could be made by Executive Order without Congressional action. 25X6

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4. Following the PSB working committee meeting on 3 July the State Department solicited HICOG views. In response, HICOG indicated on 4 July 1953 that it favored having Chancellor Adenauer request U. S. food for the Soviet zone and then on the basis of a favorable U. S. reply, having the food distributed in the Soviet zone through Protestant and Catholic church organizations. HICOG also recommended that implementation of the food plan be accompanied by a proposal by the U. S., British, and French High Commissioners, acting jointly, to suspend the application of international passes and other travel controls, provided the Soviets agreed to do likewise, in order to facilitate the distribution of food in the Soviet zone.

5. On 6 July the State Department replied to the HICOG suggestion, concurring in the proposal that Chancellor Adenauer should request the President for food for East Germany and indicating that the President would respond with a note to the Soviet Union offering food in humanitarian terms. The State Department indicated that initial food shipments would be from Army "C" ration stocks available in Europe but that the greater part of the food would probably come from U. S. surpluses. The State Department communication also stated that if the PSB approved the plan, the State Department would request HICOG to ask Adenauer to send his message to the President on 8 July, with the further intention that the President might announce his note to the Soviet Union on 10 or 11 July. The State Department also requested Ambassador Bohlen's views. Ambassador Bohlen concurred on the condition that tripartite relationships would not be prejudiced.

6. On the basis of the PSB working committee deliberations and the subsequent exchanges with HICOG, the State Department Bureau of German Affairs has drafted a memorandum for Undersecretary of State Smith, which outlines the present plan and recommends PSB approval at the PSB 8 July luncheon meeting. A draft copy of the Bureau of German Affairs memorandum is attached. In summary, the memorandum provides for a request from Chancellor Adenauer to President Eisenhower for food for the suffering East German population, to be followed by a note from the President to the USSR Government offering foodstuffs to the Soviet zone on humanitarian grounds. The U. S. note would be legally based on the U. S. Government's role as one of the occupying powers in Germany. Although the Governments

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of France and the United Kingdom would be informed in advance, the note would be unilateral. Approximately \$15,000,000 worth of foodstuffs would be offered for distribution in disaster areas of East Germany. Initial shipments would be made from U. S. Army "C" ration stocks in Europe, with the expectation that grain, oil, lard, sugar, dried skim milk, and meat would be furnished from U. S. Government surpluses. Detailed distribution arrangements would be determined after Soviet acceptance, should this occur.

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B. Recommendations

a. It is recommended that the proposals as developed by the State Department be approved at the 8 July PSB meeting and be implemented immediately thereafter. We believe that the U. S. cannot fail to achieve a significant psychological victory through this proposal if we act promptly and dramatically. Although it is almost a foregone conclusion that the Soviets would reject the offer, such a rejection would surely increase East German and satellite bitterness against the Soviet Union and its Communist regime. On the remote chance that the offer is accepted, the U. S. would be able to demonstrate both to the East German population and to the free world that U. S. offers of assistance can take concrete form. Soviet economic inability to care for its populations would also be demonstrated. Especially following the East German disturbances, the U. S. offer would afford official U. S. recognition of East German courage in resisting the Communist regime and demonstrate U. S. concern for all of Germany.

b. Whether or not the plan is carried out it would have no adverse effect on the plans of private German groups such as the churches for conducting their own food programs on purely humanitarian grounds.

c. Even if the Soviets accept the U. S. offer, the contemplated food shipments would have no appreciable long-term effect on Soviet social living conditions and tensions, but rather would more closely identify the East German population with the Western world and increase its resistance to the Soviets.

d. Since delay would encourage the belief that the U. S. Government is acting because of outside pressures, time is a vital factor for the plan. It is, therefore, recommended that PSB approval be obtained

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at the 8 July meeting and that action be instituted immediately thereafter.

[Redacted Signature]

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Acting Chief, Eastern European Division

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	TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
			REC'D	FWD'D		
1.	PP/PYD (Chief)			9 July.		
2.	PP/PYD (Dep. Chief)		10 July	10 July		
3.	ECD/C	JUL 10	1953			
4.	C/ECD					
5.	PP/PYD	1062 J	14 July 53	14 July 53		
6.	PP/PYD/C-PROP. PP/PYD (Dep. Chief)	1313 K				
7.	PP/PYD/LN	K				
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10.	NSC review completed - may be declassified in full					
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file minute informal meeting

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file minute of
informal meeting

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